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TENNESSEE COURT OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
CLAIMS
TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
IN THE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS 
AT CHATTANOOGA 
David Ballard, 
Employee, 
v. 
Brenntag Mid-South, Inc., 
Employer, 
And 
XL Insurance America, Inc., 
Carrier. 
) Docket No.: 2016-01-0186 
) 
) 
) State File No.: 95768-2015 
) 
) 
) Judge Audrey A. Headrick 
) 
) 
COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER 
GRANTING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court on August 16, 20 18, for hearing on the Motion 
for Prutial Summaty Judgment filed by Brenntag Mid-South, Inc. (Brenntag). 1 
Procedural History 
This Comt approved a settlement of Mr. Ballard's workers' compensation claim in 
November 2017. Later, Mr. Ballard filed a Petition for Benefit Detetmination for 
increased benefits. Brenntag filed the present motion for partial summruy judgment 
assetting that as a matter of law he is not entitled to increased benefits. The Comt 
summarizes the factual background to this motion as follows. 
Mr. Ballard worked as a district manager for Brenntag from April 15, 1996, until 
November 16, 2015, eaming approximately $80,000 per year. Mr. Ballard sustained a 
work injmy on October 27. Before his injmy, Mr. Ballard simultaneously worked as an 
operations manager for DUDA Energy, LLC (DUDA), a customer and/or supplier for 
Brenntag. His employment with DUDA began on August 3. Mr. Ballard admitted he did 
not disclose his dual employment to Brenntag until after his work injury. During the 
three months Mr. Ballard worked for DUDA, he eamed approximately $27,000. On 
1 The Court did not conduct an in-person evidentiary hearing in this case. Instead, the Court gleaned the 
facts from Brenntag · s statement of undisputed facts, pleadings, and exhibits . 
November 4, Mr. Ballard signed an Acknowledgement for Termination of Employment 
with DUDA.2 
Brenntag terminated Mr. Ballard on November 16 after management discovered 
his dual employment. It stated the dual employment violated its Code of Business 
Conduct and Ethics (COC) and Rules of Conduct. 
During Mr. Ballard's employment, Brenn tag maintained both an Employee 
Handbook and the COC. He signed an Acknowledgement regarding Brenntag's COC on 
January 29, 2014. 
Brenntag's COC specifically addresses conflicts of interest. The section on conflicts 
of interest states: "Conflicts of interest or the mere appearance of such a conflict must be 
avoided. Conflicts of interest arise if employees pursue personal activities or interests to 
the disadvantage of Brenntag's interests." The COC further provides that "[e]mployees 
may not accept employment with or provide services to companies competing or doing 
business with Brenntag or engage in any other kind of competing work or activity." 
Brenntag's COC also states that no employees "with confidential information 
about Brenntag, its suppliers, customers or other business partners may disclose such 
information to any third party or use such infmmation for his or her personal benefit 
while employed with Brenntag." This disclosure is only permissible under certain 
circumstances: if disclosure is made with a valid and enforceable confidentiality 
agreement; with Brenntag's prior written approval; with prior written approval of a third-
patty; or, when disclosure is mandated by law and prior notice is given, if possible, to any 
affected third-patty. 
Brenntag filed this partial summaty judgment motion on May 30 along with a 
statement of undisputed facts, a memorandum of law, the Affidavit of Linda Crouse, and 
exhibits. Mr. Ballard filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Summaty 
Judgment with no supporting affidavits. This Comt entered an order on July 5 continuing 
the motion hearing "to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had."3 T.R.C.P. 56.07. 
Brenntag argued Mr. Ballard is not entitled to additional increased permanent 
partial disability benefits under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(D)(ii) 
(20 17) due to his termination for misconduct. It also argued that he would still be 
employed at Brenntag but for his termination due to his dual employment with a 
2 The Acknowledgement indicates Mr. Duda restructured his company on October 30 and eliminated the 
operations manager position. 
3 Despite the continuance, Mr. Ballard opted not to obtain opposing affidavits . At the motion hearing, 
Mr. Ballard confirmed he did not intend to file any other documents. 
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competitor. Fmther, it argued summmy judgment is appropriate since Mr. Ballard failed 
to file any sworn affidavits or depositions. 
Mr. Ballard argued Brenntag wrongfully terminated him. He made several 
arguments regarding Brenntag's handbook and COC, which he asserted did not prevent 
him from working a second job. Mr. Ballard argued Brenntag treated him differently 
from other employees with alleged conflicts of interest. Further, he argued Brenntag 
made misleading statements in its pleadings. 
Law and Analysis 
Under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, summmy judgment is appropriate 
if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. To meet this standard, Brenntag must either: (1) submit 
affitmative evidence that negates an essential element of Mr. Ballm·d's claim, or (2) 
demonstrate that his evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of his claim. 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101; see also Rye v. Women's Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 
477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015). If Brenntag carries this burden, then Mr. Ballm·d 
"may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleading" but must respond by 
producing facts showing a genuine issue for trial. ld.; Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. In other 
words, Mr. Ballard's response "must do more than simply show that there is some 
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Payne v. D & D Elec., 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 
215, at *8-9 (Tenn. 2017). In reaching its decision, the Comt must focus on evidence Mr. 
Ballm·d presented at the summary judgment stage, "not on hypothetical evidence that 
theoretically could be adduced ... at a future trial." Rye at 265. The Court holds that 
Brenntag met its burden of demonstrating Mr. Ballard cannot establish an essential 
element of his case-that he is entitled to increased disability benefits. 
Since Brenntag met its burden, the Comt must consider whether Mr. Ballm·d 
produced facts showing a genuine issue for trial. He failed to respond to the motion as 
required by Rule 56. Although Mr. Ballard filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Pmtial Summaty Judgment with exhibits, he failed to file any sworn affidavits and/or 
depositions showing a genuine issue for trial. While his failure to respond does not 
mandate entry of summary judgment, it does prevent him from disputing any of the facts 
assetted in the statement of material facts. See United Sen'. lnds., Inc. v. Sloan, 1988 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 592, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1988) ("An adverse patty's failure 
to respond to a motion for summary judgment does not relieve the moving party of the 
burden of establishing an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law; rather, an absence 
of response only precludes factual disputes."). 
Although Mr. Ballm·d represents himself in this claim, he still "must comply with 
the same standards to which lawyers must adhere." Burnette v. K-Mart Corp., 2015 TN 
Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 2, at *6 (Jan. 20, 2015). Fmther, courts must "be mindful 
of the boundmy between faimess to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant's 
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adversary. Thus, the comts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the 
same substantive and procedural rules that represented parties al'e expected to observe." 
Id. While Mr. Ballard claimed he had "suppmting documentation" to demonstrate 
Brenntag terminated without proper cause, he presented nothing to suppm1 this assettion. 
Accordingly, the Court accepts the facts provided by Brenntag and holds that Mr. Ballard 
failed to present facts sufficient to establish a genuine issue for trial. 
The Comt notes it provided Mr. Ballard with additional time to obtain evidence 
essential to justify his opposition. It instructed him about his right to hire an attorney and 
suggested that he consult with the Ombudsman Program. The Court also urged Mr. 
Ballard to become familiar with the procedural and evidentiary rules of the Court. 
However, at the motion hearing, he stated he did not intend to submit any affidavits 
unless he prevailed. Further, Mr. Ballard's statements made during oral argument and 
exhibits filed without supporting affidavits are insufficient to establish a factual dispute. 
Because he failed to produce facts showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial, he 
failed to carry his burden. Accordingly, the Court grants Brenntag's Motion. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Court grants Brenntag's motion for partial summruy judgment and dismisses 
Mr. Ballru·d's claim for increased benefits with prejudice to its refiling. This 
ruling does not end his entitlement to ongoing medical benefits for the work 
In JUlY. 
2. Absent an appeal, this order shall become final in thit1y days. 
3. The Com1 assesses the $150.00 filing fee against Brenntag under Tennessee 
Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-21-.07, for which execution may 
Issue as necessruy. 
4. Brenntag shall pay the filing fee within five business days of the order becoming 
final. 
5. Brenn tag shall file form SD-1 within ten business days of this order becoming 
final. 
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It is so ORDERED. 
ENTERED September 4, 2018. 
Workers' Compensation Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a tiue and correct copy of this Order was sent to the following 
recipients by the following methods of service on September 4, 2018. 
Name Ce1tified First Via Service sent to: 
Mail Class Email 
Mail 
David F. Ballard, X X 224 Hickory Ridge Trail 
Employee Ringgold, GA 30736 
DavidBalJard@catt.corn 
Gerry Siciliano, X gms@l uthera11derson. corn 
Employer's Attomey 
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